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The Cost 01 Restricting Cor-
porate Takeovers:
From Switzerland
1~’IANYPEOPLE in management, labor,
banking and Congress are alarmed about the re-
cent increase in corporate takeovers. ‘These peo-
ple believe that the risk of a takeover is
detrimental to the efficient management of cor-
porations and not in the long-run interests of
the owners (see shaded insert on following
page). As a result, they have advanced various
proposals to restrict corporate takeovers.’
Others have a different view of takeovers,
believing that restrictions of takeover activity
will be harmful to shareholders’ wealth. They
argue that takeover activity is a simple manifest-
ation of competition in the market for corporate
control.’ Furthermore, by inducing corporate
management to weigh the effect of its decisions
on the present value of the corporation (and,
thus, share prices), this competition provides
strong protection for the interests of all share-
holders including those of “non-controlling”
shareholders.’ According to this view, the threat
A Lesson
of takeovers is important to maintaining an effi-
cient corporate sector.4
A recent change in Swiss commercial practice
provides important new evidence about the con-
sequences of restricting corporate takeovers.
‘The Swiss Commercial Code in the past has
allowed corporations to build effective barrier’s
against takeovers. Many Swiss firms have taken
advantage of this legal provision to protect
themselves against foreign raiders. On Nov-
ember 17, 1988, Nestle’ (by far the largest Swiss
corporation) announced that it would allow
foreign investors to buy a type of share that
only Swiss citizens could hold until then. Since
then, a foreign takeover of Nestle’ has been
possible, at least in principle.
Nestl&s announcement and the events sur-
rounding it have important implications for U.S.
proposals to restrict takeovers. This paper cx-
arnines data on the share prices of Nestle’ and
‘These include restricting voting rights to those who have
owned the stock for a minimum of one year, disallowing
interest deductions from taxable income on certain types
of bonds used to finance takeovers and a sliding scale’
capital gains tax rate that is lower the longer an asset is
held before sale. In addition, there are at least five Senate
and House panels that are planning to hold hearings on
leveraged buyouts and other types of debt-financed
takeovers. See Hershey (1988), Anders and Swartz (1988),
Norris (1988) and PasseD (1988).
‘See Manne (1965), Manne and Ribstein (1988) and Jensen
and Ruback (1983).
‘See Manne (1965), p. 113.
4See Manne and Ribstein (1988), p. 29. Some have singled
out an anti-takeover bill approved by the House Ways and
Means Committee on October 15, 1987, as an important
contributing factor to the stock market crash on October
19, 1987. See Ricks (1989).
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other Swiss firms around the November 1988
announcement date to analyze the effect of this
sudden change in policy on shareholder wealth.
If the data indicate that investors in Swiss stock
generally benefited when restrictions against
foreign takeovers were relaxed, current U.S.
proposals to limit takeovers are likely to be
counterproductive in protecting shareholder
wealth.
STOCK PRICE FUNDAMENTALS
Since stock prices represent the market value
of a firm, they play a significant role in the
analysis of this paper. Therefore, it is important
to understand how they are determined.
People value common stock for- its expected
return. Since investors may choose among
broad categories of stock, the expected return
on any particular stock must be equal to the cx-
pected return on other stocks of similar risk.
For example, if a particular stock is expected to
yield a relatively low return, investors will shun
it, causing its price to fall and its expected
return to rise until its yield is equal to that of
similar stocks. The reverse holds for any stock
with an expected return higher than other
stocks of similar risk. An equilibrium exists
when expected returns are equal across stocks
with identical risk characteristics. The
equilibrium return is called the required dis-
count rate.
Equation I calculates the expected rate of
return (r) from holding a share for one year
assuming dividends (d) are paid at year-end:’
(1) E, (r,,,4 ) = (E,P,÷ ~ -3- E,d,÷ ~ — P)IP,.
Equation I says that the expected return at time
to fholding a share of stock from t to t+ I is
equal to the expected price of the stock at the
end of the period (E,P,÷1),plus the expected
dividend (E,d,4 ~),less the current price of the
stock (P,), all divided by the current price.
Equation 2 solves equation I for the current
price by noting that the expected return equals
the required discount rate (i) in equilibrium:
‘See Brealey (1983), pp. 67-72, and Brealey and Myers
(1988), pp. 43-58.
FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF St LOUIS5
(2) Pt = (E,P,÷,+ E,d,~)/(1+i,).
Equation 2 indicates that investors must fore-
cast the price of the stock next period. What
are the fundamentals of this price? In principle,
the future price depends on the earnings of the
company, dividend payments, and the required
discount rate that investors expect to prevail
over the life of the firm. If dividends are ex-
pected to grow at a constant annual rate (g) and
the discount rate is constant, the calculation
shown in equation 2 can be simplified as in
equation 3:6
(3) Pt = d,(1+g)I(i—g).
Equation 3 gives a relatively simple solution
for the current stock price. For example, sup-
pose the current dividend is $98, the required
discount rate is 12 percent and the expected
growth rate in dividends is 2 percent. Equation
3 indicates that a share of stock in this firm will




Equation 3 is a useful summary of the fun-
damentals that determine stock prices. It in-
dicates that stock prices change when one or
more of the fundamentals change. Furthermore,
it is useful in contrasting the views of the pro-
ponents and critics of takeovers.
Critics of takeovers believe that competition
for the control of firms adversely affects the
fundamentals. For example, they argue that
takeovers increase tension between manage-
ment, labor and government to the detriment of
future earnings and dividends; or that increases
in the target’s debt-to-equity ratio that accom-
pany many takeovers increases the risk (and the
discount rate) associated with the firm’s ex-
pected earning stream; or that takeover threats
force management to concentrate too heavily on
projects that promise increased earnings in the
near term at the expense of long-term research
and development.
Others argue that the threat of takeovers im-
proves the fundamentals on net because they
induce management to use the firm’s resources
in ways that generate higher returns for the
owners. They point out that the interests of
management and shareholders can diverge and
that it is costly for shareholders to monitor
management’s decisions. In the absence of
strong competition from alternative manage-
ment teams, the firm’s managers, acting in their
own interests, can capture a portion of the
stream of earnings that would otherwise accrue
to the shareholders. This may come in the form
of high management salaries, large expense ac-
counts, plush offices, lengthy vacations and
other forms of shirking. Shirking affects the
distribution of earnings between the firm’s
management and its owners. Furthermore, it
may lower the stream of earnings generated by
the firm. The cost associated with this type of
behavior, called “agency cost,” lowers the ex-
pected stream of dividends that accrue to
shareholders and is reflected in lower share
prices.’
The reduction in share price due to agency
costs is a measure of the capital gain that could
be obtained from a successful raid. According
to this argument, competition among alternative
management teams in the market for corporate
control assures that agency costs are kept to a
minimum, resulting in higher share prices for
firm owners.8 Thus, this theory suggests that
takeover activity raises stock prices while the
one mentioned earlier implies the opposite.
What evidence is there to support either
view? Data on U.S. takeovers suggests that they
raise stock prices.’ The recent changes in the
Swiss stock market should make Swiss data par-
ticularly useful in adding to this body of
evidence.
SWISS STOCK MARKET INSTITU-
TIONAL DETAILS
Registered) Bearer and Non-voting
Shares
Swiss law allows corporations to issue several
types of shares called bearer, registered and
non-voting shares. Bearer shares are the equi-
valent of the typical common share issued by
°Brealey(1983), p. 69. The current price is defined by
equation 3 only if the expected growth rate of dividends is
less than the discount rate.
‘See Manne (1965), Manne and Ribstein (1988) and
Alchian (1977), pp. 227-58.
‘See Manne (1965), p. 113, and Ruback (1988).
‘See Jensen and Ruback (1983).
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U.S. corporations. Ownership of a bearer share
entitles the holder to the dividends and one
vote at shareholder meetings. They can be
transferred without restriction.
Registered shares differ from bearer shares in
several important respects. For example, the
purchase of a registered share entitles the
buyer to dividends but does not grant the new
owner the automatic right to vote at share-
holder meetings. ‘To obtain voting rights, the
new owner must apply to be “registered” in
the firm’s book of shareholders. Until the new
owner’ is registered, the voting right remains
with the previous (and still registered) owner.
Registration of the new owner, however, is not
automatic. The corporate charter can summarily
exclude certain investors from registration.’”
Furthertnoxe, Swiss stockbrokers have declared
publicly that they will refuse to exercise buy
orders from clients that are unlikely to qualify
for registration.” While registration is often
restricted to Swiss citizens or institutions and,
thus, can effectively prevent foreign takeovers
of Swiss firms, this tool has been used to block
Swiss raiders as well.”
A glance at the stock market page of a Swiss
newspaper reveals that about a third of the Swiss
corporations issue register’ed shares. Because
these firms typically issue more registered shares
than beat-er shares, registered owners hold the
controlling interest in the companies that issue
both.” Coupled with the provisions regarding
registration, this gives these Swiss firms iron-
clad protection against hostile takeovers.
Besides registered and hearer shares, large
companies issue securities that pay dividends
but have no voting rights associated with them.
Holders of these non-voting shares (participation
certificates) have virtually the same rights as
voting shareholders) apart from the right to vote.
Djfferent .Par Values
Dividend payments and the share of the firm’s
liquidation value that accrue to Swiss stock-
holder-s are proportional to the par value of the
shares they hold. Both registered and bear-er
shares carry one vote. Swiss firms, however’,
are allowed to issue registered shares with
lower’ par values than bearer shares. For exam-
ple, let R be a registered share with a par value
of $50 while B is a bearer share with a par
value of $100. Both shares carry one vote but
the expected stream of dividends generated by
the registered share is one-half that of the
bearer share. Other things the same, the
registered share will trade at about one-half the
price of the bearer share. Table I summarizes
the participation rights of the different types of
shares.
NESTLING UP TO SHARE
HOLDERS
To the surprise of many market participants,
the common Swiss practice of discriminating
against foreign investors was suddenly changed
on November 17, 1988. Nestlec the Swiss multi-
national foods group, decided to register shares
of foreign investors. Nestle’ had been repeatedly
criticized for attempting to take over firms in
countries outside Switzerland while being pro-
tected from foreign acquisition. In a release that
accompanied the announcement, Nestle~sfinance
director explained that “there was a contradic-
tion between being multinational in our
behavior and national in our’ share control.””
~cSee Homer (1988) and Foreman (1988). In the 1930s, this
restriction was used to prevent takeovers of Swiss firms by
firms in Nazi Germany. See “Shareholders, Who Are
They?” (1989).
“See Homer (1988), pp. 70-71, and Foreman (1988).
“See Dullforce (August 9, 1988) and Wicks (August 2,
1988), who report on the takeover battle for La Suisse, a
Swiss insurance company. In that case, the highest Swiss
bidder for La Suisse withdrew his otter after the La Suisse
board announced that it would refuse to register the bid-
der’s shares.
“See “Shareholders, Who Are They?” (1989). For the
number of shares issued of each type, see Swiss Bank
Corporation, (1987).
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Because of Nestle”s relative size, its decision
was viewed as extremely important by market
participants.” Since then, several other Swiss
firms have made similar announcements.” Fur-
thermore, the Swiss parliament is currently con-
sidering revisions to the commercial code that
would make Swiss firms more accessible to out-
siders. In part, such revisions have been pro-
mpted by Swiss shareholders who claim that
they ar-c adversely affected by anti-takeover
rules. On the other hand, some Swiss citizens
believe that hostile takeovers could harm Swiss
companies and that management should be pro-
tected from raiders. Although the outcome of
this debate is uncertain, the decision by Nestle’
and other Swiss tirms to liberalize shareholder
registration marks a significant step in changing
Swiss commercial practices regarding corporate
takeovers.
The theory of the market for corporate con-
trol suggests that impediments to takeovers are
costly, which means that they reduce share-
holder wealth. According to this theory, one
consequence of reducing impediments to take-
overs is that the capitahzed value of the firm in-
creases. To test this, data on ~ share
prices before and after November 1988 are ex-
amined. Since Nestl&s decision is viewed as hav-
ing important consequences on the entire Swiss
stock market, share price data on 44 other
firms traded on the Zurich exchange are ex-
amined as well.”
THE SWISS EVIDENCE
To determine the effect of the loosening of
voting restrictions on corporate shares in
Switzerland, daily closing prices are analyzed at
three points in time: the last trading days in
December 1985, July 1988 and December 1988.
The July 1988 date leads NestleSs announcement
by about three months to minimize the possibili-
ty that advance information about the forthcom-
ing announcement might affect prices. The
December 1988 date is the month immediately
following the announcement month. The reason
for choosing the December 1985 date is discuss-
ed below. The sample consists of nine firms
that issue only bearer and non-voting shares, 21
firms that issue all three types of shares and is
that issue only registered and bearer shares. A
list of the firms appears in the appendix. The
data are adjusted for differences in par values
between different share types of the same
company.
Did Registered Shares Trade at a
Discount to Bearer Shares?
The first question examined is whether regis-
tered shares typically traded at a discount to
bearer and non-voting shares of the same firm
before November 1988.18 Table 2 shows the
ratios of the prices of registered to bearer and
registered to non-voting shares for the same
firm at three points in time: December 1985,
July 1988 and December 1988.
The 36 firms in this sample differ in several
respects. Some issue non-voting shares; others
do not. In addition, some of the firms in the
sample issue registered and bearer shares with
the same par values while others issue these
shares with different par values. Table 2 ex-
amines data on the price ratios while controlling
for these differences.
Panel A of table 2 shows the mean of the
ratio of registered to bearer share prices for
the 21 companies that issue all three types of
shares. The data are prices for the close of the
last trading day of the month. The null hypothe-
sis that the mean of the price ratios is one is re-
jected at a5percent significance level for the
two dates before November 1988 but not for
the December 1988 prices. The ratios for the
December 1985 and July 1988 dates are indis-
tinguishable in a statistical sense, suggesting
‘4A practical motivation for the decision was suggested by
William Duliforce who commented that “Nestle’s access to
capital markets was restricted by the differentiation bet-
ween registered and bearer shares.” See Dullforce
(November 18, 1988).
“The value of Nestle shares account for about 10 percent
of the total Swiss stock market. See “Shareholders, Who
Are They?’ (1989), p. 69.
“The most recent firm to make a similar announcement is
Jacobs Suchard, a coffee and chocolate concern. See
Wicks (June 22, 1988).
“The Zurich stock exchange is the largest in Switzerland.
More than 400 Swiss and foreign companies are listed on
this exchange along with a much larger number of bonds.
“Some have argued that tax considerations and differential
transaction costs imply that registered shares will sell at a
discount to bearer shares. Since these factors did not
change during the period analyzed, however, they cannot
explain significant changes in relative share prices
associated with Nestle’s decision to allow foreigners to
purchase its registered shares.
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that the discount on registered shares prevailed
long before Nestk~sannouncement.’” Thrs dis-
count vanished, however, by December’ 1988.
The panel B data differs from the panel A
data in two respects. The price ratios in panel B
cover’ firnis that issue only registered and
hearer shares (no non-voting shares). Further-
more, the par values of each firm’s r-egistered
shares ar-c lower than the par values of the
bearer shares for the firms in this panel. Since
the stockholders of Swiss firms share dividends
in proportion to the par values of the shares
they hold, registered shares with lower par
values than bearer shares should sell at a dis-
count to bearer shares regardless of ownership
restrictions on registered shares. i’o control for
this “par value” effect, the register-ed share
prices of the panel B firms are adjusted for dif-
ferences in the par values.
The results shown in panel B are similar to
the panel A results. The mean of the ratios of
registered to bearer share prices is significantly
less than one before Noventher 1988 but is
statistically indistinguishable from one for the
December i988 data.
The data in panel C cover fir’ms issuing only
registered and bearer shares with the same par
values. The results shown are similar to the
panel A and B results for data before November
1988. The result for the December 1988 data
differs, however. While the ratio of registered
to bearer share prices is numerically higher for’
the December 1988 data than it was previously,
it still is significantly less than one.
The Increase In ivestle”s Market
Value
‘Table 3 shows the change in the market value
of Nestle’ shar’es from the end of July 1988 to
the end of December 1988. As shown, the
market value of Nestle’ increased by almost 22
percent subsequent to its November policy
change. Of course, this figure may over- or
understate the change in value due to the policy
change because other- factors that affect stock
prices may have changed.
To control for this, table 4 shows the percen-
tage changes in the prices of bearer and non-
voting shares for the firms in our’ sample that
do not issue registered shares. Since the Nestle’
announcement pertained only to the treatment
of registered shareholders, it is unlikely that the
announcement would affect the share prices of
[inns that issue no registered shares. Changes
in the prices of these fir-ms between July and
December 1988 can be used to proxy the effect
of changes in other factors on Swiss stock
f)I’ices.
“The discount is present in data extending back to
December 1975.





l’he data in table 4 rndicate that the share
price-~of these firms did not ‘ise from July to
December 1988. While the point estimates of
the average percentage change are negati~ e in
both ca es, they are not significantly dffer ent
fr )ni iero. Thus, these data suggest that o her
general influences did not r arse or lower Swiss
The fQestle’ Announcement and the
Share .Prices of Other Firms
The data in table 2 suggest that the ratio of
registered to bearer share pr-ices rose from July
to December 1988 for the 36 firms that issue
both types of shares. i’he data in table 5 show
that the increase in this ratio resulted fr’om a
significant increase in the price of registered
shares rather than from a decline in the price
of bearer shares. This is important in evaluating
whether the change in policy actually augments
the shareholders’ wealth. Any change that re-
duces the differences between the share types
will cause their prices to converge even though
stockholder wealth may not increase. For exam-
ple, if the share prices converge because bearer
and non-voting share prices generally decline
while registered share pr-ices remain unchang-
ed, aggregate stockholder wealth will fall. If
registered share prices increase while other
stock prices from July to December 1988. Con-
sequently, the 22 percent increase in the mar’-
ket value of Nestle’ can be taken as a “ball park”
estimate of the rise in value associated with its
change in registration policy.
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Table 5




Type of share’ 7/88—12/8B t-score N
Registered 14.95%’ 544 36
Bearer --1.79 71 36
Non-voting .13 03 21
- Significantly different from 2ero at the 5 percent level
Twenty one ot the 36 firms in this samplo issue all threetypes
of shares Fifteen of the firms issue only registered and
bearer shares.
share prices are constant, however, aggregate
wealth will increase.
The data in table 5 are consistent with the se-
cond case. Registered share prices increased by
about 15 percent from July to December 1988
while changes in the prices of bearer and non-
voting shares are not significantly different
from zero. Again, the table 4 data suggest that
the increase in registered share prices is not
due solely to other factors.
CONCLUSION
Recent experience with corporate takeovers
has raised concerns that the capital of corporate
shareholders is being held hostage by Wall
Street power brokers. Accordingly, various re-
forms designed to reduce takeover activity have
been proposed.
This paper examines an economic theory that
treats the control of a firm as a valuable asset.
‘Fhe theory suggests that takeovers represent
trades of this asset in a market for corporate
control and that such market competition pro-
vides strong protection for the interests of
shareholders.
Data on the Swiss stock market are analyzed
to determine whether restricting the market for
corporate control affects stockholder wealth.
Until recently, ownership restrictions on Swiss
registered shares had prevented foreign citizens
from competing for control of many Swiss
firms. These restrictions were relaxed in Nov-
ember 1988. Data analyzed in this paper suggest
that the’ registered share prices of firms rose by
about iS percent while the prices of bearer and
non-voting shares were roughly constant follow-
ing the relaxation. The data suggest that restric-
ting competition in the market on corporate
control can have serious adverse consequences
on the wealth of shareholders. Since recent pro-
posals to reform the takeover market in the
United States intend to restrict this activity,
they are likely to be counterproductive in pro-
tecting shareholder capital.
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Types of Shares Issued
Firm
Types of Sflares Issued
Registered Bearer Non-voting Registered Bearer Non-voting
Elekrowatt II Sandoz III
Fortuna I I Schindler III
Gotthard Bank I I Swiss Bank
lnterdiscount IICorporation III
Pirelli I I Schweizer Rueck III
VP Bank Vaduz I I Union Bank of
Walter Rentsch I I Switzerland III
Zuercher Zurich Insurance I II









B.S.I. I/I Credit Suisse II
Bank Leu //I Crossair II
Bobst //I Frisco Findus II
Brown Boveri //I Hermes II
Buehrle I I I Hero II
Ciba Geigy /II Huerlimann II
Feldschloesschen III Mikron II
Georg Fischer I/I Usego II
Haldengut III Eichhof II
Jacobs Suchard I/I Holzstoff II
Konsumverein Hypo Brugg / I
Zurich III Sibra Holding / I
Moevenpick //I Swissair / I
Nestle //I
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